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Abstract
We examined whether an expected future activity (exercise vs. relaxation) impacts a present behavior (performance on an
intellectual task) that occurs prior to this activity. Across two experiments (n ¼ 320 and n ¼ 466), the influence of expected
exercise compared to relaxation on present intellectual performance was moderated by general self-efficacy (GSE)—a core
personality trait that determines people’s confidence that they can surmount physically or intellectually challenging activities.
Participants high in GSE had better intellectual performance when they were expecting to exercise versus relax, whereas the
effect reversed under low GSE. Moderated mediation analyses suggested that task-focused attention (i.e., participants’ level of
focus while solving the intellectual task) accounted for a significant proportion of variance between the future activity (exercise vs.
relaxation) and present intellectual performance across different GSE levels. These findings document a previously unexplored
channel through which future expectations shape present outcomes.
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People spend a significant portion of their time thinking about
the future, and anticipation of future actions can interfere with
their present endeavors (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Very
little, however, is known about how expectations of future
activities shape seemingly unrelated present actions that are not
undertaken in the service of preparing for these activities
(Krpan et al., 2019). In this research, we therefore investigated
whether an expected future activity impacts a present behavior
that occurs prior to it. For the expected future activity, we
manipulated physical exercise versus a state at the opposite end
of the spectrum in terms of energetic requirements (relaxation),
both because of their broad relevance and because they can
serve as proxies for behaviors of varying degrees of effort
(Shiraev & Barclay, 2012; Wright, 2008). For the present beha-
vior, we focused on intellectual performance since it is repre-
sentative of many everyday tasks one may pursue at work or
elsewhere.
The Influence of Future Expectations
on Present Actions
Although various studies examined how expected future pur-
suits (e.g., exercise) shape present actions undertaken in the
service of these pursuits (e.g., making exercise plans; Carraro
& Gaudreau, 2013), few studies tested whether anticipated
future actions impact present endeavors not directly relevant
to them. Krpan et al. (2019) labeled such behavioral effects
“spillunders” and identified only eight research articles that
examined them. For example, expecting to engage in an
anxiety-inducing behavior—giving a speech—compared to
control increased cookie consumption, but only for restrained
eaters (Polivy et al., 1994). Despite little evidence of spillunder
effects documented in the literature, Krpan et al. (2019) dis-
cussed several theoretical models (e.g., motivational intensity;
Brehm & Self, 1989) based on which it is possible to speculate
that such effects are more common than thought. Below, we
overview these and additional theoretical accounts that, even
if they do not directly tackle spillunders regarding physical
activity versus relaxation, allow making predictions in this
regard. As will be clarified, these accounts generate mixed pre-
dictions: Some of them suggest people will perform better on a
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current intellectual task if they expect to exercise versus relax,
and some indicate the opposite.
For example, Brehm and Self’s (1989) motivational inten-
sity model indicates that people’s intellectual performance may
be better if they anticipate exercising (vs. relaxing) thereafter.
According to this model, undertaking a challenging but feasible
activity (e.g., physical exercise) should increase people’s levels
of physiological energization compared to a nonchallenging
task (e.g., relaxation) to allow meeting the demands of this
activity (Wright, 2008). Elevated energization, however, does
not occur only while people are pursuing challenging activities
but also when they merely anticipate undertaking them (Wright
et al., 1986). For example, when people expected undertaking a
memory task, their energization levels—measured via systolic
blood pressure—increased if the task was difficult versus easy
(Contrada et al., 1984; Wright et al., 1986). In line with these
findings, people expecting to exercise (vs. relax) may experi-
ence increased energization at present, which may in turn boost
their intellectual functioning, considering that energization is
linked to enhanced performance on various intellectual activi-
ties (e.g., Sevincer et al., 2014; Wright, 2008).
Several other lines of theorizing, however, indicate that
intellectual performance may decrease when people anticipate
exercising rather than relaxing. According to the conservation
hypothesis, people have limited self-regulatory resources and
therefore need to conserve these resources depending on activ-
ities they undertake throughout the day (Janssen et al., 2010;
Muraven et al., 2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009). For example,
expecting an effortful activity in the future (e.g., a performance
test that requires remembering numbers) impaired people’s
present cognitive performance (Muraven et al., 2006). In line
with this rationale, when people anticipate exercising versus
relaxing in the future, they may enter the resource conservation
mode—a state in which their intellectual functioning is less
optimal.
In another line of research, Macrae et al. (2014) showed that
imagining an effortful activity (e.g., resisting appealing snacks
at a party) in the near versus distant future impaired people’s
present self-control in a different domain (e.g., resisting pur-
chasing desirable products). Because activities that require
exerting effort soon (vs. later) may appear more effortful given
that people tend to focus on their feasibility (Trope & Liber-
man, 2010), this finding suggests that people anticipating an
effortful (e.g., exercise) versus low-effort activity (e.g., relaxa-
tion) may experience weakened intellectual capacity. Indeed,
although impaired self-control itself may not be directly rele-
vant to intellectual performance because its primary role is
resisting temptations, self-control is one of the core executive
functions that is determined by the same pool of cognitive
resources as directed (i.e., task-focused) attention—a process
that shapes intellectual functioning (Diamond, 2013; Kaplan
& Berman, 2010).
A final account that would predict lowered intellectual per-
formance under expected exercise versus relaxation is cogni-
tive interference (Sarason, 1984; Sarason et al., 2014).
According to this account, demanding (vs. easy) physical or
intellectual tasks may interfere with people’s present cognitive
processing (i.e., with key executive functions that shape intel-
lectual functioning, such as task-focused attention), which may
manifest as reduced performance on intellectual tasks (Ash-
craft & Kirk, 2001; Diamond, 2013; Sarason et al., 2014).
The Role of Personality: General Self-Efficacy
(GSE)
Overall, the competing theoretical accounts allow mixed pre-
dictions regarding the effect of anticipating exercise versus
relaxation on current intellectual performance. We therefore
posit that, to postulate a hypothesis, it is necessary to identify
a moderator variable that determines when intellectual func-
tioning may be better under expected exercise and when under
expected relaxation. As the most relevant moderator that may
reconcile the overviewed conflicting predictions, we propose
GSE—a core personality trait that determines how confident
people are that they can surmount challenging tasks, from intel-
lectual to physical (Bandura, 1982; Chen et al., 2001; Scholz
et al., 2002).
GSE is associated with many psychological processes that
may shape both how people perceive various physical and
intellectual activities and respond to them, including optimism,
self-esteem, being more emotionally stable and less susceptible
to negative emotional states, believing that one can accomplish
difficult tasks and face challenges, and so on (e.g., Ackerman &
Wolman, 2007; Chen et al., 2001; Ebstrup et al., 2011; Judge
et al., 2002, Luszczynska et al., 2005). High GSE, which is
inherently compatible with difficult and challenging activities
(Scholz et al., 2002), such as exercise (vs. relaxation), may
therefore constitute a general propensity that makes people
receptive to any potential positive effects of these activities
on cognition, as anticipated by theories such as the motiva-
tional intensity model (Wright, 2008). In contrast, low GSE
is incompatible with demanding tasks (Chen et al., 2001) and
may thus constitute a general propensity for such tasks to acti-
vate adverse psychological processes detrimental to intellectual
performance, in line with models such as cognitive interfer-
ence, the resource conservation hypothesis, or the impaired
self-control account (Janssen et al., 2010; Macrae et al.,
2014; Sarason et al., 2014). We therefore predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: GSE will moderate the influence of antici-
pated exercise versus relaxation on present intellectual per-
formance: People high (low) in this trait will perform better
(worse) when expecting to exercise versus relax.
We posit that GSE may be a more important moderator than
specific forms of self-efficacy directed at exercise (e.g., peo-
ple’s confidence to complete challenging exercises despite
potential obstacles; Marcus et al., 1992) for several reasons.
First, because GSE comprises positive beliefs that spread
across a variety of domains rather than just one activity (e.g.,
exercise), being high in this trait may allow any potential pos-
itive outcomes of exercise on cognitive functioning to “spill-
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under” into other domains (e.g., intellectual performance).
Moreover, even if people have low exercise self-efficacy for
some reason (e.g., because they generally do not exercise),
physical activity should not have negative consequences for
their cognitive functioning if their GSE is high and they are
comfortable facing challenges.
Finally, it is necessary to posit an overarching mechanism
that would explain the effect of expected exercise versus
relaxation on present intellectual performance as moderated
by GSE. Theories we have reviewed proposed various mechan-
isms that may underlie this effect, from energization (Wright,
2008) to resource conservation (Tyler & Burns, 2009). The
question is, however, whether there is a common denominator
that underpins these and related processes and serves as the
core mechanism. We propose that this mechanism is task-
focused attention (i.e., the ability to focus on a task at hand and
block irrelevant information), which has been identified as one
of the key cognitive processes that determine intellectual per-
formance (De Dreu et al., 2012; Engle, 2002; Shipstead
et al., 2016). Importantly, all theoretical models discussed con-
cerning Hypothesis 1 indicate that factors such as energization,
resource conservation or self-regulation more generally, and
cognitive interference may be associated with a change in
task-focused attention (Diamond, 2013; Krpan et al., 2019).
For example, whereas energization may make the person
more attentive to a task (Wright, 2008), energy conservation
or cognitive interference may impair their attentional capacity
(Diamond, 2013; Muraven et al., 2006). In line with this ratio-
nale, any psychological benefits experienced by high self-
efficacy individuals expecting to exercise (vs. relax) should
be summed up in their increased ability to focus that enhances
intellectual performance. In contrast, any adverse psychologi-
cal effects experienced by low self-efficacy individuals expect-
ing to exercise (vs. relax) should be reflected in their reduced
ability to focus that undermines the performance. We thus pre-
dict the following:
Hypothesis 2: Task-focused attention will explain a signif-
icant portion of the moderated influence of anticipated exer-
cise versus relaxation on present intellectual performance,
given that high (low) GSE participants will be more (less)
attentive when solving the intellectual task in the exercise
versus relaxation condition and that increased task-focused
attention will predict better intellectual performance.
Overview of Studies
We tested the hypotheses in two experiments where we ran-
domly assigned people to the expected exercise versus relaxa-
tion conditions and assessed their present performance on
reasoning items (Mensa, 2015). As exercise, we used high-
intensity interval training (HIIT) because it is a popular and
brief physical activity suitable for various contexts, including
the experimental setting (Shiraev & Barclay, 2012). The
experiments had identical design apart from several mediator
and moderator variables (Table 1) important for understanding
the mechanism behind the effects of exercise (vs. relaxation) on
intellectual performance. In this regard, beyond testing
Hypothesis 2, we undertook additional steps to clarify the
mechanism.
First, because we speculated that GSE should be a more
important moderator than domain-specific self-efficacy, in
Experiment 2, we assessed situational and ordinary exercise
self-efficacy (Table 1) to evaluate this assumption. To establish
GSE as the core moderator, in this experiment, we also
assessed other traits that are, alongside GSE, known as core
self-evaluations and are closely linked to it: self-esteem, neuro-
ticism, locus of control, and self-concept clarity (Campbell
et al., 1996; Judge et al., 2002). Second, we tested additional
mediators (Table 1). Although we hypothesized that task-
focused attention would be the core overarching mechanism,
we also examined more specific processes that were either
informed by the theories we overviewed (e.g., motivational
intensity; Wright, 2008) or that we found relevant concerning
our research (Table 1). If the effects predicted for task-
focused attention (Hypothesis 2) also apply to these processes,
this would warrant a further examination to understand whether
they specifically guide the attention. If, however, this is not the
case, it may be plausible that expected exercise versus relaxa-
tion shapes task-focused attention via an “umbrella” of differ-
ent psychological underpinnings rather than one or few
dominant processes.
Method
Participants and Power Analyses
In Experiments 1 and 2, 334 (female ¼ 234, male ¼ 100, and
other ¼ 0) and 467 (female ¼ 291, male ¼ 176, and other ¼ 0)
participants took part, respectively. In Experiment 1, 14 parti-
cipants were excluded due to a technical malfunction that pre-
vented them from answering all critical measures (included
participants: exercise, n ¼ 161 and relaxation, n ¼ 159). In
Experiment 2, one participant was excluded from analyses
because of not completing any questions measuring the depen-
dent and mediator variables (included participants: exercise,
n ¼ 233 and relaxation, n ¼ 233). Given that age may shape
physical fitness (Hall et al., 2017), it was restricted to 18–32
years (Experiment 1) and 18–35 years (Experiment 2). In
Experiment 2, the age range was slightly larger because we
aimed to recruit more participants in that experiment (Supple-
mentary Material [SM], p. 116). In both experiments, the data
were analyzed only after we stopped data collection; a detailed
rationale behind sample sizes is explained in SM (pp. 35, 116).
Sensitivity power analyses (Faul et al., 2009) showed that,
concerning the moderation predicted by Hypothesis 1,
both experiments were sufficiently powered (1 – b ¼ .80;
a ¼ .05) to capture relatively small Cohen’s f2 effects (Experi-
ment 1 ¼ .025; Experiment 2 ¼ .017), assuming the cutoff of
.02 (Cohen, 1988).
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Procedure and Measures
The procedure and measures from both experiments are
detailed in SM (pp. 9–31, 91–112). Table 1 summarizes all key
variables and provides a brief rationale behind additional med-
iators. Covariates are presented only in SM (pp. 20–25, 102–
104) due to space limitations. All experiments were conducted
at the London School of Economics (LSE) Behavioral Lab.
Before coming to the lab, participants were informed that the
experiment might involve exercising and they would need to
bring exercise gear to be eligible to participate, but only during
the experiment, they would be informed whether they would
need to exercise. For each participant, the experiment was con-
ducted during a single session.
At the start of each experiment, all moderators (Table 1) and
covariates (SM, pp. 4–8) were measured. Then, participants
completed the consent form and were randomly allocated to
either the exercise or relaxation condition and received the cor-
responding instructions regarding the activities (HIIT or relaxa-
tion) they would undertake at the end of experiment. For HIIT,
they were told they would engage in a 7-min workout (Mattar
et al., 2017) consisting of 12 intense exercises, 30 s each, with
10-s rest periods in-between. For relaxation, they were told
they would relax by watching YouTube videos they find fun
Table 1. Key Variables Measured in Experiments (Exp.) 1 and 2.
Variable Exp.
Dependent variable
1. Intellectual performance (assessed via eight reasoning items that required participants to identify either a pattern that continues
a sequence or the underlying logic in a set of symbols or patterns; Mensa, 2015, pp. 55, 124, 155, 267, 334, 365, 379, and 383.
Intellectual performance score could range from 0 to 8, corresponding to the items correctly solved)
1 and 2
Main and alternative moderators
2. Main moderator: General self-efficacy (Chen et al., 2001) 1 and 2
3. Situational exercise self-efficacy (confidence that one can complete challenging exercises on the day of experiment, assessed via five
items created in line with Bandura, 2006)
2
4. Ordinary exercise self-efficacy (Marcus et al., 1992) 2
5. Neuroticism (John & Srivastava, 1999) 2
6. Self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) 2
7. Self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996) 2
8. Locus of control (Levenson, 1973) 2
Main and alternative mediators
9. Main mediator: Task-focused attention (operationalized as participants’ memory of the intellectual performance items, e.g., Craik,
2014. In eight questions, participants were asked to accurately identify either an item from the intellectual performance task, among
several dummy items, or specific visual elements belonging to the item, among several dummy elements. Task-focused attention
scores could range from 0 to 14 in Exp. 1 and 0 to 17 in Exp. 2, given that the task questions were altered between the two
experiments to ensure Hypothesis 2 is not supported only for one set of questions. To correctly answer the memory questions, it
was not necessary to have correctly solved the corresponding intellectual performance items.)
1 and 2
10. Arousal (Bradley & Lang, 1994; proxy for energization and relevant to the motivational intensity model; Wright, 2008) 1 and 2
11. Valence (Bradley & Lang, 1994; Found to influence cognitive performance: Gray et al., 2002). 1 and 2
12. Tiredness after intellectual performance versus baseline (relevant to the resource conservation account; Tyler & Burns, 2009) 1
13. Exhaustion after intellectual performance versus baseline (relevant to the resource conservation account; Tyler & Burns, 2009) 1
14. Persistence in solving the intellectual items (proxy for energization and relevant to the motivational intensity model; Wright, 2008) 1
15. Depletion after answering the intellectual items (relevant to the resource conservation account; Tyler & Burns, 2009) 1
16. Ease of answering the intellectual items (assessed because task ease shapes strategies people use to solve it; Oppenheimer, 2008) 1
17. State anxiety (Schmader & Johns, 2003; assessed because anxiety can interfere with cognitive functioning; Shields et al., 2016) 1 and 2
18. Effort invested in the intellectual task (proxy for energization and relevant to the motivational intensity model; Wright, 2008) 1 and 2
19. Conserving energy during the intellectual task (relevant to the resource conservation model; Tyler & Burns, 2009) 1 and 2
20. Solving the intellectual items to feel good (assessed to understand the motives behind participants’ performance) 1
21. Solving the intellectual items due to curiosity (assessed to understand the motives behind participants’ performance) 1
22. Solving the intellectual items to demonstrate competence (assessed to understand the motives behind participants’ performance) 1
23. Distraction experienced during the intellectual task (proxy for conscious experience of cognitive interference; Sarason et al., 2014) 2
24. Participants’ own estimate regarding how many (of eight) intellectual-task items they solved correctly (assessed to understand the
link between self-awareness and performance)
2
25. The extent to which participants thought they did well on the intellectual performance task (assessed to understand the link
between self-awareness and performance)
2
26. Construal level (CL; Burgoon et al., 2013; assessed because of the implications of CL for reasoning; Braga et al., 2015) 2
Note. Variables 2–8 were assessed on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree (1) or disagree strongly (1) to strongly agree (5) or agree strongly (5). Variables 10 and 11
were assessed via 9-point manikins ranging from calm to alert and unpleasant to pleasant, respectively. Variables 12, 13, and 17 were assessed on a 5-point scale
from very slightly or not at all (1) to extremely (5). Variables 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 25 were assessed on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7). Finally, Variable 18 was assessed on a 4-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). Extended version of this table is available in Online
Supplementary Material, pp. 4–8).
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and easy to watch. Thereafter, we measured two alternative
mediators—arousal and valence—and subsequently the depen-
dent variable—intellectual performance (Table 1). Next, sev-
eral alternative mediators were assessed. In Experiment 1,
these mediators were tiredness after intellectual performance
versus baseline; exhaustion after intellectual performance ver-
sus baseline; and persistence, depletion, and ease regarding
solving the intellectual items; in Experiment 2, only distraction
experienced during the intellectual task was assessed at this
stage (Table 1). Thereafter, the main mediator—task-focused
attention—was measured as outlined in Table 1.
In the end, participants received the questions probing the
remaining mediators. More specifically, in both experiments,
state anxiety, effort invested in the intellectual task, and conser-
ving energy during the intellectual task were assessed. Media-
tors specific to Experiment 1 were solving the intellectual items
due to curiosity, to feel good, and to demonstrate competence
(Table 1). Mediators specific to Experiment 2 were partici-
pants’ estimate of their intellectual performance, self-
perception of the intellectual task performance, and construal
level (Table 1). Finally, participants undertook either HIIT or
relaxation, after which they were debriefed and reimbursed.
Results
The data and analysis codes are available from the Open
Science Framework: https://osf.io/zgq3h/. Zero-order correla-
tions between all variables are available in SM (pp. 34, 115).
Descriptive statistics can also be found in SM (pp. 32, 33,
113, and 114). All variables were used in the analyses in their
raw format.
Main Effects
Before probing the hypotheses, we first examined the impact
of condition (exercise vs. relaxation) on intellectual
performance using independent samples t tests. These analyses
showed that HIIT (MExperiment 1 ¼ 4.043, MExperiment 2¼ 4.039,
SDExperiment 1 ¼ 1.489, SDExperiment 2 ¼ 1.753) and relaxation
condition (MExperiment 1 ¼ 4.126, MExperiment 2 ¼ 4.030,
SDExperiment 1 ¼ 1.492, SDExperiment 2 ¼ 1.820) did not differ
regarding intellectual performance in either Experiment 1,
t(318) ¼ .494, p ¼ .622, d ¼ .055, or Experiment 2,
t(464) ¼ .052, p ¼ .959, d ¼ .005.
Hypothesis 1
In each experiment, the hypothesized interactions between con-
dition (exercise vs. relaxation) and GSE were computed using
multiple linear regressions and their patterns further probed via
the Johnson–Neyman technique (Hayes, 2018; Johnson & Fay,
1950; Long, 2019). As the significance criterion, a ¼ .05 was
used. Table 2 contains the output of these regressions and the
Johnson–Neyman intervals for all interaction terms. This inter-
val corresponds to the levels of the moderator below (above)
which the effect of exercise (vs. relaxation) on intellectual per-
formance was significantly negative (positive). The interac-
tions are also depicted in Figure 1. In line with Hypothesis 1,
GSE was a significant moderator in both experiments: People
expecting to exercise (vs. relax) performed better (worse) on
the intellectual performance task at high (low) levels of the
moderator, as indicated by the Johnson–Neyman intervals
(Table 2).
To probe robustness of these findings and examine whether
GSE was the most important moderator, we first tested the
interactions between the additional moderators (Table 1) and
condition. Situational exercise self-efficacy, ordinary exercise
self-efficacy, neuroticism, self-esteem, and self-concept clarity
yielded significant interaction effects (all ps  .016; SM,
pp. 117–119). We therefore examined the interactions between
condition and the additional moderators that yielded significant
effects in the same regression models as the interactions
between condition and GSE for comparison (SM, pp.
Table 2. The Influence of the Interactions Between the Exercise Versus Relaxation Condition and General Self Efficacy (GSE) on Intellectual
Performance in Experiments 1 and 2.
Variable b SE b t p 95% CI f2 JN interval
Model 1: Condition (C)  GSE (Experiment 1)
(Constant) 6.598 0.699 9.433 <.001 [5.222, 7.974] .282 —
C 4.928 1.037 4.755 <.001 [6.968, 2.889] .072 —
GSE 0.639 0.178 3.582 <.001 [0.990, 0.288] .041 —
C  GSE 1.232 0.260 4.741 <.001 [0.721, 1.743] .071 [3.726, 4.299]a
Model 2: C  GSE (Experiment 2)
(Constant) 6.843 0.768 8.906 <.001 [5.333, 8.353] .172 —
C 5.420 1.118 4.850 <.001 [7.617, 3.224] .051 —
GSE 0.709 0.191 3.702 <.001 [1.085, 0.333] .030 —
C  GSE 1.356 0.276 4.913 <.001 [0.814, 1.899] .052 [3.739, 4.251]a
Note. Model 1, R2 ¼ .07; Model 2, R2 ¼ .05. f2 refers to Cohen’s f2 effect size. JN interval labels the Johnson–Neyman interval. For Condition, 0 ¼ relaxation and
1 ¼ exercise (high-intensity interval training).
a In both Experiments 1 and 2, the JN interval contained the mean values of GSE (MExperiment1¼ 3.936; MExperiment2¼ 4.005), which means that on average exercise
versus relaxation did not significantly impact intellectual performance.
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130–132). In all cases, the interactions involving GSE
remained significant (all ps < .001), whereas the interactions
involving the alternative moderators stopped being significant
(all ps  .114). We conducted similar analyses for covariates
that were correlated with GSE—that is, the interactions
between condition and these covariates were tested alongside
the interactions between condition and GSE (SM, pp. 41–49,
133–136). Again, GSE remained a significant moderator in all
cases (all ps < .001), whereas the interaction terms for the
covariates were not significant (all ps  .071). To additionally
ascertain robustness of the findings, we also tested the interac-
tions between condition and GSE while controlling for all cov-
ariates simultaneously—these interactions remained similar as
in the main analyses (SM, pp. 37–40, 127–129).
Overall, Hypothesis 1 was robustly supported and GSE
established as the most important moderator. Although we did
not consider this in our theorizing, it is important to point out
that condition changed the relationship between GSE and intel-
lectual performance (for details, see Figure 1): In the exercise
(relaxation) condition, this relationship was positive (negative).
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 was tested using a moderated mediation, com-
puted via the Process package (Model 8; Hayes, 2018) and
percentile-bootstrapped with 20,000 samples. To support the
hypothesis, the analysis had to yield three effects (at p < .01
or 99% CI to minimize type I error, given that each moderated
mediation involves multiple significance tests): (1) In the first
multiple linear regression that constitutes the analysis and
includes condition (exercise vs. relaxation), the moderator
(GSE), and their interaction as predictors (Model 1), the inter-
action term had to significantly impact the mediator (task-
focused attention); (2) in the second regression that includes
the moderator, condition, their interaction, and the mediator
as predictors (Model 2), the mediator had to positively predict
intellectual performance; and (3) the overall index of moder-
ated mediation that indicates whether including the mediator
in Model 2 absorbs a significant portion of the variance
between the Condition  Moderator interaction and intellec-
tual performance had to be significant. Effects (1) and (2) were
significant in both experiments (Table 3). Finally, the overall
index of moderated mediation was significant in Experiment
1, (a3ibi)d ¼ .56, 99% CI [0.24, 0.94], and Experiment 2,
(a3ibi)d ¼ .65, 99% CI [0.32, 1.03]. Therefore, Hypothesis 2
was supported for both experiments, and this was the case even
after controlling for covariates (SM, pp. 52–55, 139–141). No
other mediator variables measured in Experiments 1 and 2 were
significant (SM, pp. 57–86, 142–161), thus establishing task-
focused attention as the main mediator among the ones we have
considered. In this regard, however, it is important to point out
that the direct effect of Condition  GSE interaction on intel-
lectual performance remained significant in both experiments
(Table 3, Models 2), thus suggesting there may be additional
important variables that were not identified contributing to the
mechanism.
Given that one of the main limitations of mediation analysis
in determining psychological mechanisms is that the
link between a mediator and dependent variable is not causal
(Fiedler et al., 2018), which implies that several different mod-
els can be fit using the same variables, we compared the main
moderated mediation model in which task-focused attention
was a mediator of intellectual performance with a “reverse”
model in which intellectual performance was a mediator of
task-focused attention. Although the overall index of
Figure 1. The influence of anticipated high-intensity interval training
(HIIT) versus relaxation on intellectual performance at different levels
of general self-efficacy (GSE) in Experiment 1 (Panel A) and Experi-
ment 2 (Panel B). The moderator levels were selected arbitrarily for
effective visualization; more detailed graphs comprising a full range of
moderator values are available in Online Supplementary Material
(pp. 36, 120). Y-axis corresponds to the number of intellectual per-
formance items correctly solved (of eight). Error bars denote the 95%
confidence intervals (CIs). As indicated in the figure, GSE was posi-
tively related to intellectual performance under HIIT (Experiment 1:
b ¼ .593, p ¼ .002; 95% CI [0.221, 0.965], f2 ¼ .031; Experiment 2:
b ¼ .647, p ¼ .001; 95% CI [0.257, 1.038], f2 ¼ .023), but negatively
under relaxation (Experiment 1: b¼.639, p < .001; 95% CI [0.990,
0.288], f2 ¼ .041; Experiment 2: b ¼ .709, p < .001; 95% CI
[1.085, 0.333], f2 ¼ .030). Across the entire sample, GSE was
therefore not related to intellectual performance (Experiment 1:
b ¼ .023, p ¼ .861; 95% CI [0.278, 0.233], f2 < .001; Experiment 2:
b ¼ .031, p ¼ .824; 95% CI [0.302, 0.240], f2 < .001).
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moderated mediation for the main model was larger in magni-
tude, the alternative model also produced a significant effect
(SM, pp. 86–90, 162–166). Whereas this finding is consistent
with Hypothesis 2, it indicates that alternative models that can
explain the mechanism also remain probable.
Discussion
In two experiments, we examined whether a high- (exercise)
versus low-effort (relaxation) expected future activity influ-
ences an unrelated behavior that occurs prior to it (intellectual
task performance), depending on participants’ GSE. At higher
GSE levels, people solved more reasoning problems when
expecting to engage in HIIT versus relaxation, whereas the
effect reversed under low GSE (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, mod-
erated mediation analyses provided insights into the mechan-
ism behind this influence by showing that task-focused
attention absorbed a significant portion of the variance between
condition (HIIT vs. relaxation)  GSE interaction and intellec-
tual performance when tested in the same regression model
(Hypothesis 2). This is because high (low) GSE participants
were more (less) attentive when solving the intellectual task
in the HIIT versus relaxation condition and because task-
focused attention positively predicted intellectual performance.
Next to the main analyses, we undertook several steps to fur-
ther clarify psychological processes at play in this research.
Concerning GSE, we argued that this would be the main mod-
erator, more important than specific forms of self-efficacy or
other closely linked but narrower constructs, given that GSE
is associated with many processes relevant to intellectual and
physical functioning (e.g., Luszczynska et al., 2005). This
overarching nature of GSE may therefore make people suscep-
tible to numerous beneficial or adverse cognitive states,
depending on their score on this trait and the demands of the
anticipated future activity. We indeed demonstrated that GSE
was the most important moderator by analyzing it alongside
exercise self-efficacy, other closely linked personality con-
structs such as self-esteem (Judge et al., 2002), and several cov-
ariates. To further understand psychological consequences of
GSE, we also examined its correlations with various alternative
moderators and covariates measured in the present research
(for details, see SM, pp. 34, 115): Higher GSE was linked to
a range of outcomes, including higher situational and ordinary
exercise self-efficacy, increased self-esteem and self-concept
clarity, higher locus of control, lower neuroticism, increased
exercise motivation, positive mood, perseverance in accom-
plishing tasks, not being easily distracted, liking of challenges,
perceiving oneself as more physically fit, or preference for
challenging intellectual activities. Therefore, our assumption
about GSE as a trait associated with many constructs relevant
to mental and physical functioning was supported, and our
findings suggest that the role of GSE in determining the effects
Table 3. Linear Regression Models for Moderated Mediation Analyses in Experiments 1 and 2.
Variable b SE b t p 99% CI f2 JN interval
Linear Regression Models for Moderated Mediation in Experiment 1
Model 1: Impact of Condition (C)  General Self-Efficacy (GSE) on task-focused attention (TFA)
(Constant) 12.312 1.199 10.267 <.001 [9.205, 15.420] .334 —
C 8.756 1.777 4.927 <.001 [13.361, 4.151] .077 —
GSE 0.882 0.306 2.885 .004 [1.674, 0.090] .026 —
C  GSE 2.207 0.446 4.953 <.001 [1.052, 3.361] .078 [3.595, 4.363]
Model 2: Impact of C  GSE and TFA on intellectual performance
(Constant) 3.488 0.729 4.783 <.001 [1.598, 5.377] .073 —
C 2.717 0.971 2.797 .005 [5.233, 0.200] .025 —
TFA 0.253 0.030 8.527 <.001 [0.176, 0.329] .231 —
GSE 0.416 0.163 2.551 .011 [0.839, 0.007] .021 —
C  GSE 0.675 0.244 2.770 .006 [0.044, 1.306] .024 [2.906, n.s.]
Linear Regression Models for Moderated Mediation in Experiment 2
Model 1: Impact of C  GSE on TFA
(Constant) 16.159 1.410 11.461 <.001 [12.512, 19.806] .284 —
C 11.771 2.051 5.739 <.001 [17.075, 6.466] .071 —
GSE 1.560 0.351 4.439 <.001 [2.468, 0.651] .043 —
C  GSE 2.944 0.507 5.812 <.001 [1.634, 4.254] .073 [3.705, 4.288]
Model 2: Impact of C  GSE and TFA on intellectual performance
(Constant) 3.275 0.797 4.109 <.001 [1.213, 5.336] .037 —
C 2.821 1.059 2.665 .008 [5.560, 0.083] .015 —
TFA 0.221 0.023 9.516 <.001 [0.161, 0.281] .196 —
GSE 0.364 0.179 2.037 .042 [0.827, 0.098] .009 —
C  GSE 0.706 0.262 2.698 .007 [0.029, 1.383] .016 [1.968, n.s.]
Note. Model 1 (Experiment 1), R2 ¼ .07; Model 2 (Experiment 1), R2 ¼ .24; Model 1 (Experiment 2), R2 ¼ .07; Model 2 (Experiment 2), R2 ¼ .21. f2 refers to
Cohen’s f2 effect size. JN interval labels the Johnson–Neyman interval, and n.s. indicates that one or more of the interval values were not significant. For Condition,
0 ¼ relaxation and 1 ¼ exercise (HIIT). The key pathways used in computing the overall index of moderated mediation are highlighted in gray.
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of expected future activity on intellectual performance cannot
be reduced to only one or few of these constructs.
Concerning task-focused attention, we argued that this
would be the core mediator because it may comprise various
psychological processes proposed by theories we used to
develop Hypothesis 1 (e.g., Janssen et al., 2010; Macrae
et al., 2014; Wright, 2008) and is also known to guide intellec-
tual functioning (Diamond, 2013). In this regard, we consid-
ered two possibilities. First, the moderated effect of exercise
(vs. relaxation) on intellectual performance may be mediated
by both task-focused attention and more specific theoretically
relevant processes, which would warrant further investigation
into whether these few specific processes underpin changes
in task-focused attention that alter intellectual performance.
The second possibility was that expecting to exercise versus
relax shapes task-focused attention via an “umbrella” of
psychological underpinnings rather than one or few dominant
processes. Our findings support the second explanation.
Task-focused attention was the only robust mediator. More-
over, it was correlated with several alternative mediators we
assessed (for details, see SM, pp. 34, 115). For example,
increased task-focused attention was linked to investing more
effort and conserving less energy when solving the intellectual
task, feeling less anxious and being more persistent when sol-
ving the task, or feeling less distracted when solving the task. It
is therefore plausible that task-focused attention comprises a
range of psychological processes, none of which are dominant
in accounting for its link to intellectual performance.
Contributions and Implications
The present research makes several main contributions. Most
importantly, it constitutes one of the few studies that examined
spillunders (Krpan et al., 2019) and offers arguably the most
comprehensive and nuanced examination of the mechanisms
behind such effects to date. Whereas previous research focused
on domains such as food consumption or morality and gener-
ally did not provide an in-depth examination of the mechanism
(Krpan et al., 2019), our focus was on the domains of physical
activity and intellectual performance, and we systematically
examined 18 theoretically relevant mediators and seven mod-
erators (Table 1) to establish the most important ones.
Although we conducted our studies in relation to specific activ-
ities (intense exercise, relaxation, and solving reasoning items),
these activities are representative of numerous everyday beha-
viors. For example, exercise (relaxation) is broadly representa-
tive of any activities that involve considerable (little) effort
(Wright, 2008), whereas many endeavors in which people
engage concerning their work, education, or other pursuits
require some form of reasoning and problem-solving
(Diamond, 2013). Our research therefore suggests that low
GSE individuals may be better off engaging in challenging
intellectual tasks at present when the activities they expect to
undertake thereafter require low rather than high effort,
whereas high GSE individuals may excel under the opposite
circumstances. Future research will need to examine to which
specific activities this model applies and establish its boundary
conditions.
Limitations
The main limitation of the present research (for additional lim-
itations, see SM, pp. 167, 168) concerns several unresolved
questions regarding the mechanism behind the spillunder
effects we obtained. Our analyses indicated both that more than
one mediation models were supported and that a significant
proportion of the mechanism remained unexplained by task-
focused attention. Future research will therefore need to probe
the mechanism using a more convincing causal technique
(e.g., experimental-causal-chain; Spencer et al., 2005) and
explore whether there are additional important mediators next
to task-focused attention we failed to identify. Moreover,
although this was not considered in our theorizing, we found
that, under expected exercise, GSE was positively related to
intellectual performance, whereas the relationship reversed
under expected relaxation. Given that literature typically links
GSE with various cognitive processes that may benefit cogni-
tive functioning (e.g., Ackerman & Wolman, 2007), it remains
unclear why the relationship between GSE and intellectual per-
formance changed depending on the expected future activity.
This may be a fruitful area to explore in future research because
it may provide new insights into how situational circumstances
shape the relationship between GSE and behavior.
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